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Indiana Supreme Court Holds Plaintiff Forfeited Opportunity to Conduct Evidentiary Hearing to Challenge The Constitutionality of The Medical Malpractice Act

Posted on January 15, 2013 in Litigation Analysis

Published by: Hall Render

On January 15, 2013, the Indiana Supreme Court issued a 5-0 opinion authored by Justice Robert Rucker in Plank vs. Community Hospital affirming the trial court’s denial of Plank’s request for an evidentiary hearing to challenge the constitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Act concluding that Plank had forfeited his opportunity to conduct such a hearing.

Plank had argued that the Medical Malpractice Act violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Article I, Section 23), the separation of powers guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 and Article VII, Section 1 and the takings clause (Article I, Section 21) of the Indiana Constitution. The State of Indiana had argued that the holding in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. “definitively” settled the constitutionality of the Act’s cap. The Supreme Court disagreed with this position acknowledging that the determination of constitutionality can be challenged. The Court did not address the constitutionality of the cap but whether Planck was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the constitutional argument.

The Hospital argued that Plank’s arguments regarding the constitutionality were waived on appeal because his constitutional challenge was not properly preserved at trial at the appropriate time. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the debate over whether Plank had waived his constitutional challenge was “misplaced.” Instead, the Court focused its attention on the question if Plank forfeited the opportunity to conduct a hearing to develop his constitutional claim.

The Supreme Court first noted that the matter had been pending for over six (6) years before the trial, both parties had conducted extensive discovery and a two (2) week trial had taken place but at no time did Plank notify the trial court of his intent to challenge the constitutionality of the cap imposed by the Act. In rejecting Plank’s argument that his first opportunity to challenge the cap was after the jury verdict, the Court noted that Plank’s admission at oral argument that the damages were almost entirely compensatory and the majority of the $8.5 million verdict was in special damages. It was the Court’s opinion that Plank was aware that the cap applied to this case and he should have anticipated that a motion to reduce the verdict award would be filed if the verdict exceeded the limit on damages. The Supreme Court further noted that Plank not only failed to make a pre-trial motion regarding his intention to challenge the constitutionality of the cap, he failed to make any such claim during the trial. He not only failed to object when Community Hospital moved to reduce the award in accordance with the cap, Plank agreed to prepare a proposed judgment for the trial court. It was only eight days after the verdict that Plank objected to the reduction of the award and requested a hearing. The Supreme Court held that Plank had forfeited any opportunity he otherwise may have been afforded to conduct an evidentiary hearing because he failed to take the steps necessary to preserve his constitutional claim.

The Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the constitutionality of the cap on damages under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act can be revisited suggests that the Court is willing to reevaluate the issue in future cases. Healthcare providers should anticipate plaintiffs will now file notices of intent to challenge the constitutionality of the cap on most, if not all, cases and be prepared to argue the same.

Should you have any questions, please contact your regular Hall Render attorney.