On April 17, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued an important decision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) which clarifies the harm necessary to make a claim of discrimination actionable when the claim rests on a job transfer. Title VII provides, in part, that it is unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
The Muldrow Decision
Given the language of the Act, there could be no dispute that the failure to hire or discharge a person because of a trait protected by Title VII was actionable. In the April 17, 2024 decision, Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (“Muldrow“), the Court gave meaning to what constitutes “discriminat[ion] against” an individual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of employment and, in particular, in the context of job transfers.
In Muldrow, the employer transferred the plaintiff, a woman who served as a plainclothes police officer, and replaced her with a male. The plaintiff was reassigned to uniform duty. Importantly, the transfer did not result in a change in her rank or pay. However, her responsibilities, perks and schedule did change. For example, she no longer worked with high-ranking personnel and instead was supervising neighborhood patrol officers and even did some patrol work herself. And, while she used to work a regular Monday through Friday schedule, the new assignment had her rotating in on weekend shifts.
The federal district court dismissed the case (by granting summary judgment for the employer) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision. In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit held that the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working conditions.” That Court relied on the proposition that a Title VII claimant had to demonstrate that she suffered a “materially significant disadvantage.”
The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a discriminatory job transfer, in order to be actionable, had to be significant, serious, substantial “or any similar adjective.” Instead, the Court concluded that Title VII simply requires that discrimination based on a protected characteristic be based on the fact that the person was treated “worse.” The focus is not on “how much worse.”
The Court highlighted a distinction between a Title VII discrimination claim and a Title VII claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity (such as making a complaint of discrimination). The Court noted that, under its own precedent, a Title VII retaliation claimant must demonstrate that the job change was “materially adverse.” However, as the Court explained, less “serious” harm in the context of retaliation would not have the effect of deterring Title VII enforcement. With a discrimination claim, by contrast, that deterrence effect was less material.
Practical Takeaways
Going forward, employers facing the prospect of (or actual) Title VII claims involving a job transfer will not find cover under the notion that the employee’s transfer did not result in a “significant” change in the terms or conditions of employment. Of course, the transfer must have some such change.
If you have any questions, please contact:
- Jon Rabin at (248) 457-7835 or jrabin@hallrender.com; or
- Your primary Hall Render contact.
Hall Render blog posts and articles are intended for informational purposes only. For ethical reasons, Hall Render attorneys cannot—outside of an attorney-client relationship—answer an individual’s questions that may constitute legal advice.
